

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
221ST RECONNAISSANCE AIRPLANE COMPANY (O-1)
13TH COMBAT AVIATION (DELTA) BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96296

Annual Supplement to

The Unit History

of the

221ST RECONNAISSANCE AIRPLANE COMPANY (O-1)

APO San Francisco 96296

1 January 1966 – 31 December 1966

Written By

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Approved By

Major William T. Poor [683]

In accordance with appropriate regulations, this Yearly Supplement to the unit history is submitted. Only those items which have been particularly significant to the actual function of the Company's ability to accomplish its mission in combat will be discussed. Routine administrative and general modes of housekeeping are not pertinent for the intent of this supplement, and therefore will not be discussed.

As you may have noticed already, the title of the unit was changed during the year. Formerly designated the 221st Aviation Company (Surveillance Airplane Light), the unit is now the 221st Reconnaissance Airplane Company (O-1)

There are eight major areas of interest which have a direct relationship to the unit's combat operations. From these major areas stem many side effects which must be included in order to create a more comprehensive view point. The eight major areas are:

1. Operation Bird Dog
2. Mass Rotation of Personnel
3. Spot Reporting
4. Combat and Operational Losses
5. Supply
6. Maintenance and Aircraft Availability and Flying Hours
7. Building and Expansion of Facilities.
8. Tactics and Employment

OPERATION BIRD DOG

Perhaps the most significant occurrence during the entire year was the results of Operation Bird Dog. Had the results been other than they were, the Army would have lost operational control of the O-1 assets in the IV Corps area, and in fact the entire Republic of Vietnam.

Operation Bird Dog was the code name given a directed test period to study the possible realignment of existing O-1 assets for more effective utilization. The original test directive was in the form of MACV COS Memorandum, dated 26 February 1966, SUBJECT: Realignment of O-1 assets. Implementation instructions were contained in a 2nd Air Division operation order "Bird Dog", dated 15 March 1966.

The basic concept for the test was that all O-1 aircraft in the IV Corps area could provide more adequate mission fulfillment if they were unified under the control of a single headquarters for operational control, namely 2nd Air Division, further delegated to the IV Corps DASC.

The concept of operation for the test, as quoted from the 2nd Air Divisions operational order was:

A. Operational control will be exercised by 2AD through the TACC to the respective Corps DASC's. The DASC's in turn, will specify operating locations for all assigned USARV/USAF O-1 aircraft and direct their employment for mission accomplishment through the ARVN Corps Division USAF ALO's.

B. The ARVN Corps/Division USAF ALO's with assistance from US Army G/S-2 and 3 personnel, will schedule aircraft to meet the requirements of the ground commander. Aircraft will not be scheduled for flight, except for maintenance checks, without approval of the Corps/Division ALO or his designated representative. Aircraft will only be scheduled for flights directly related to the combat mission.

C. Mission priorities are established as follows.

Priority 1 - Air Strike Control (FAC)

Priority 2 - Artillery/Naval Gunfire Adjustment

Priority 3 - Radio Relay/Convoy/Ship Escort

Priority 4 - Visual Reconnaissance

Priority 5 - Other - Liaison, Courier, Training, Maintenance

D. Aircraft from either service may be used to perform required missions. Army aviators, when qualified by their parent unit, may mark and describe targets for attack aircraft. Army aviators marking targets will have radio communications with the strike aircraft and will provide all necessary information as to location and identification of the target and the location of friendly forces. In the absence of a fully certified FAC, the strike mission leader will otherwise exercise full control of the mission.

E. While each service will normally operate its own aircraft, in cases of operational necessity or emergency, aircraft may be flown by pilots of either service.

F. For daily operations, US Army Senior Advisors will be required to insure preplanned requirements for ARVN ground forces, including special missions, are made known as early as possible to their G/S-2 and 3's or Sector/Division USAF ALO's, who will in turn schedule resources to meet their requirements and coordinate aircraft utilization with the appropriate DACS. ALO's will be expected to respond to immediate requirements with available assets and advise the DASC if additional resources are required.

Qualified USAF FAC will be utilized on air strike operations when available.

G. Aircrew flight indoctrination and training will be the responsibility of each service. Reciprocal training is permitted as mutually agreed upon by TASS and the respective USARV Aviation Company.

H. All aircraft concerned with this OPORD will be reported daily IAW the TACC F-1 Report format. Additional reports will be as directed by the DASC Deputy Director. Special reports required by the Test Director will be outlined in a separate letter of instructions concerning only those forces

involved.

The initial date the test was to have begun was 15 March, however a delay of five days was encountered, the actual test period started at 0100 hours on 20 March 1966.

The specified duration of 30 days was not met as it was felt by all the agencies that the continuation would not be sufficiently beneficial., therefore the test was ended after twenty two days.

The summation of comments by all supported agencies was as follows: There was no question that the concept was feasible, but not at the level tested. Such a concept is employed at the sector level, and indeed has been since the arrival of the 221st in RVN.

Centralized control at a removed level from the ground commander being supported did not increase availability. It did in fact lessen user control and add another stumbling block to immediate response.

The recommendations forwarded at the end of the test period have been adopted and, to date, seem to be the best solution. Those recommendations were:

A. That each service maintain control of its resources.

B. That USAF/USARV pilots be cross trained in each others missions and perform such missions when necessity requires it.

C. That the supported level, namely sector level, have operational control of the aircraft assigned to support that area. This control to be exercised with general guide lines provided by the responsible command of USAF/USARV aircraft assets.

MASS ROTATION OF PERSONNEL

The problems encountered in this area were not new, nor were they peculiar to this company. They did however affect, to a degree, the over all operation of the unit. The basic premise for mission accomplishment is that we have one pilot and aircraft stationed in each sector of the IV Corps (ARVN)

Tactical Area. By being assigned to a specific sector or area, the same pilot flying the area day after day, becomes so thoroughly familiar with that sector that he is able to immediately spot any changes which occur. When I say changes, I refer to the addition of one or two bunkers in this area, another 100 meters of trench line in this area, or excessive movement of sampan traffic in an area where there is normally none, or very little. A considerable amount of time is required to become that familiar with an area. In order to insure continuity of surveillance, it would be most desirable to have the replacement in the sector with the old pilot for at least one month. Normally this is not possible and it was particularly not possible during the mass replacement program which took place between 15 May 1966 and 15 July 1966.

Replacement pilots arrived in groups of three and four with only a few days spacing between them. As the Standardization and Checkout SOP was at that time, it took a minimum of six to eight hours to completely check out one pilot. There was only one instructor pilot at company headquarters, therefore it took at least four days to complete the check outs for four people. This was a loss of time for the pilot and a loss of utilization by the company.

Two things could have eliminated the problem. Had an infusion program been initiated upon the company's arrival in country, at least to some degree, the problem would have been lessened by a more widespread rotation structure. Secondly, at this point was instituted, the check out given new arrivals was modified to eliminate a complete IV Corps area orientation ride. This was left to the platoon IP's. By doing so, it then only required about two hours to check out a new pilot. He could be with his platoon two days after arrival and there by be assigned his sector faster, allowing more time for flights with the outgoing pilot.

As stated at the beginning, this problem is not new, nor peculiar to this unit. It will not recur in this unit as far as replacement pilots are concerned. As sufficient spacing of rotation has come about by

new arrivals being more evenly spaced, and the transfer of personnel in and out of the unit.

Just as important however, are the maintenance personnel in the enlisted grades. As this company came to RVN as a complete unit, the same problems arose within the maintenance framework. Many of the crew chiefs and maintenance platoon mainstays departed within days of each other. This necessitated, in some cases, sending a relatively inexperienced crew chief to a field site some thirty to eighty miles away from his home maintenance support. There he was required to perform on his own in a situation unfavorable to an inexperienced man. The manner in which these personnel performed can be seen in the accident rate, maintenance availability rate, and flying hours of the unit. Their performance in the face of lack of experience and in the face of the aforementioned odds can only be assessed as outstanding.

One point which should be stressed concerning the availability of aircraft is that combat losses are extremely hard to replace. When aircraft are lost to combat, a replacement is always months away. This is because a replacement must come from outside the Republic of Vietnam and must be newly introduced into the system. It cannot be drawn from the rotating aircraft at ARADMAC. No replacement aircraft are available for Army procurement, so it becomes more difficult with each loss to obtain a replacement.

SPOT REPORTING SYSTEM

Since the initial deployment of the company, and being given the mission of providing reconnaissance and surveillance for the IV Corps (ARVN) tactical area, reliance had been on the supported area or sector to pass all intelligence gathered by the "Shotguns" to higher headquarters.

When a sighting was made, the "Shotgun" pilot making it would call the sector for which he worked and give them the information. This in turn was funneled to the division, and by the division on to IV Corps headquarters.

There were several drawbacks to this system. First, communications were not always good over large distances. Secondly, whether or not the reports went to IV headquarters depended on a large degree on the importance placed on it by the reporting level. In any event, timely reports were not always getting to the Corps G-2/3 for recording and reaction.

In an attempt to provide a more immediate source of information to IV Corps headquarters, the 221st initiated a "Spot Report System". The essence of the system was to set up a frequency to be monitored by 13th Combat Aviation Battalion personnel and be ready at all times to receive intelligence reports and instantly relay them to IV Corps (ARVN) headquarters. This gave the information to IV Corps headquarters within minutes after it was reported to the sector in which it occurred. In operating the system, the procedure was; when a "Shotgun" made a sighting he immediately notified the sector or sub-sector in which it was made. He gave them complete information on the sighting. As soon as his report to sector was completed, he changed frequencies and gave the same report to the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion S-2 who immediately relayed it to Corps G-2/3 and the information was in the hands of almost everyone concerned simultaneously.

The initial idea of the system was for use by "Shotguns", but it proceeded so successfully that it has now been put into a USARV Regulation and is standard procedure for all aircraft throughout Vietnam

A small measure of the benefit derived from the system can be seen by the statistics for the first month of its' operation. There were 87 sightings turned in by "Shotgun" pilots and some type of action was taken on 43 of them.

COMBAT AND OPERATIONAL LOSSES

The losses incurred by this unit during 1966 were phenomenally low. For the purpose of this supplement these are divided into two categories, combat losses and operational losses.

The 221st lost one pilot and aircraft to hostile fire during the year. Captain Paul W. Johnson [443] was killed and the O-1D aircraft he was flying was destroyed when the aircraft was shot down by enemy ground fire on 22 July 1966 in the vicinity of Can Tho, South Vietnam. The aircraft came under intense ground fire and was struck several times, causing the crash, while in support of a sector operation.

A second aircraft was lost to combat damage on 19 May 1966/ At 0030 hours on that date, Soc Trang Airfield came under attack by Viet Cong mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire. One 75mm round landed three feet in front of an O-1D parked on the maintenance line. The resultant explosion destroyed the aircraft.

In regard to operational losses, the company lost three aircraft to accidents. Two were lost as a result of loss of directional control after landing, caused by gusty wind conditions at Soc Trang Airfield. The third aircraft was lost due to engine failure from an undetermined cause while flying over a heavily wooded area on Phu Quoc Island. The aircraft was destroyed completely by friendly fire after it had crashed into the trees and was uneconomically repairable. The cause of the engine failure was never determined because of the inaccessibility of the wreckage. Maintenance personnel were unable to remove any of the remaining parts. The pilot and observer aboard escaped without injury and were extracted by helicopters within minutes after the crash.

In summation of this area of discussion I refer to my original statement that the losses were extremely low. I use that wordage to describe the loss of only one pilot and five aircraft over a twelve month period during which the company pilots and aircraft flew a total of 35,917 hours and received in excess of 90 individual hits in the 32 aircraft assigned.

SUPPLY

Even though requisitions older than 30 days are showing only about 34% completed actions,

the supply support is considered fairly good. There is an inherent delay of two to three months or more when an item has to be extracted from the U.S. or Okinawa. There is also difficulty in RVN in getting supplies shipped to the unit. Until recently the unit had two U-6A aircraft assigned and this helped account for a higher number of filled requisitions in as much as we were able to pick them up from support facilities.

Normal supply procedures as outlined in AR 735-35 are used by the 221st.

In the Delta, our IV Corps area of RVN there are basically two echelons of supply support for Class II or IV items. Items such as field gear, weapons, ammunition, "C" rations, pilot helmets, and replacement tools will usually be shipped within 60 days. Fatigues wear out sooner and DX facilities are frequently out of common sizes. A few specific problems of supply support are as follows:

A. We have experienced cases which indicate that normal requisitions don't always get the job done. Our A-2 shop set, a very vital part of the company's maintenance capability, sat on a support facility loading ramp for two months before it was forwarded by ##### of the 13th Battalion. The support facility apparently didn't know we had a requisition in for the item, although the 1st Brigade ##### had sent out a TWX in an attempt to locate the van.

B. An issuing agency in Saigon stated that we did not have a valid requisition for VRC-10 survival radios, even though the unit supply had a "due out" on the same. The S-4 of the Brigade thought we had been using that as a basis of reports to higher headquarters and issuing agencies.

C. Equipment is sometimes shorted or pilfered during transit from support unit to the company. As an example: 21 survival kits arrived with a shipping document which stated that 60 had been shipped. Three follow-ups were returned to the unit advising that the items had been shipped over 100 days before.

FLYING HOURS, MAINTENANCE, AND AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

During the period 1 January 1966 to 31 December 1966, the 221st Reconnaissance Airplane Company (O-1) flew a total of 35,817 hours in an average of 30 aircraft. This extremely high number of hours was made possible by the maintenance platoon's outstanding efforts. During the entire twelve months period an average availability rate of 90% was maintained. This in itself was a major accomplishment in as much as there were several problem areas which had been over come, or lived with.

One of the major shortages of equipment was the A-1 and A-2 aircraft shop set. These items of equipment was not received in the company until 22 November 1966. They were "due in" in July 1965.

Another problem area encountered is that no hangar facility exists for the maintenance platoon. All maintenance is performed in the open. The resulting difficulties are that during the rainy season there is almost a daily loss of one or two hours of work because of rain. During the dry season the wind blows almost constantly and creates a problem of dirt getting into engines when they are being worked on. The temperature reflecting off the hardstand in the maintenance area reaches above the hundred degree mark almost daily. A design and cost estimate for a hangar facility to be constructed has been submitted but thus far no final approval has been obtained.

Parts have become an item of concern due to the loss of the two U-6 aircraft formerly assigned to the company. As was stated in the section on supply, when these aircraft were available, it was always simple to get the items we needed because we had the means to transport them. With the loss of those two aircraft, coupled with the Army's loss of the Caribous, which eliminated a daily parts delivery formerly made by the 57th Caribou Company, we now have to rely on helicopter support to make the parts pickups. With the number of tactical airmobile operations conducted in the Delta, the

maximum fulfillment of requests for helicopter support that we can expect is about 40%.

The problem areas discussed did not prevent an outstanding year of accomplishment by the maintenance personnel. Through many trips and constant liaison with support facilities, and the high caliber of maintenance personnel in the unit an average of 2,984.6 hours was flown every month of 1966 in support of the IV Corps (ARVN) tactical area. This could be accomplished because of the already mentioned average of (90%) availability of aircraft.

BUILDING AND EXPANSION OF FACILITIES

At the beginning of the year, the company area was in a very poor state. There were no sidewalks, insufficient billets, insufficient latrine and shower facilities and insufficient supply storage.

Through constant personnel liaison with Pacific Architect and Engineers on the part of the supply officer and company commander some of the needed items began to materialize. In May 1966 the R&U section on post began to pour sidewalks throughout the company. Those are a necessity during the rainy season.

Billet space was so lacking that the prescribed amount of space per man could not possibly be adhered to. In July the work began to increase and by October all the needed billets were constructed to include a new shower room and latrine. These new billets now permit sanitary living conditions which meet prescribed standards.

A new arms room, mail room, and supply annex was completed in late November, with the added storage space provided by the supply annex, items which were stored in steel conex containers are no longer exposed to the elements.

The arms room provides adequate storage space for all the unit weapons and a large section of the room contains work benches for proper cleaning and care of weapons.

Ample space is now available in the mail room for the daily volume of mail and provides

adequate security for the mail.

TACTICS AND EMPLOYMENT

The tactical use of the O-1D aircraft assigned to the 221st Reconnaissance Airplane Company has remained basically the same as it has been since arrival in Vietnam.

The mission of providing a coordinated and integrated surveillance and reconnaissance effort to the IV Corps (ARVN) area is still in effect. The one area of slight change has been that more emphasis is placed on types of tasks, which the O-1 is capable; radio relay, message drop and pickup, psychological warfare and convoy coverage.

The utilization of aircraft during the conduct of operations is outstanding. "Shotgun" aircraft covered every operation from sector level through Corps level, conducted during 1966. This alone is testament to the value placed on the "Shotguns" by every echelon supported.

The 221st Reconnaissance Airplane Company (O-1) "Shotguns" have truly lived up to their motto of "Eyes over the Delta" in providing the IV Corps (ARVN) with outstanding results. The accomplishments in every field of endeavor, despite the hardships of a combat environment and shortages of equipment, exemplify the true spirit of the American soldier, Through inspired leadership, pride in the unit, and the United States of America, and the motivation of being a part of a well organized team, this year has been one of achievement for every member of the unit. An example of the outstanding achievements of the unit is seen by the unit being recommended for the Meritorious Unit Commendation.

ANNEXES

A. COMPANY DEPLOYMENT

B. AIRCRAFT AND PILOT FLYING HOURS

C. AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

D. ROSTER OF PERSONNEL JOINING THE UNIT DURING 1966

E. ROSTER OF UNIT COMMANDERS

F. ROSTER OF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

G. ROSTER OF PLATOON LEADERS

H. ROSTER OF FIRST SERGEANTS

Annex A: Company Deployment

Company Headquarters – Soc Trang

1st Platoon (9th Division)

Division Aircraft	(3ea) – Vinh Long
Sector Aircraft	
Vinh Binh	(1ea) – Tra Vinh
An Giang	(1ea) – Long Xuyen
Vinh Long	(1ea) – Vinh Long
Chau Doc	(1ea) – Chi Lang
Kien Giang	(1ea) – Rach Gia
Kien Phong	(1ea) – Cao Lahn
Total	9ea

2nd Platoon (IV Corps – Special Forces)

IV Corps Aircraft	(3ea) – Can Tho
Special Forces Aircraft	(2ea) – Can Tho
Total	5ea

3rd Platoon (7th Division)

Division Aircraft	(3ea) – Vinh Long
Sector Aircraft	
Kien Tuong	(1ea) – Moc Hoa
Kien Hoa	(1ea) – Ben Tre
Go Gong	(1ea) – Go Gong
Dinh Tuong	(1ea) – My Tho
Total	7ea

4th Platoon (21st Division)

Division Aircraft	(3ea) – Bac Lieu
Sector Aircraft	
Bac Lieu	(1ea) – Bac Lieu
An Xuyen	(1ea) – Ca Mau
Ba Xuyen	(1ea) – Soc Trang
Choung Thien	(1ea) – Vi Than
Phong Dinh	(1ea) – Can Tho
Total	8ea

The remaining two aircraft support the 221st Reconnaissance Airplane Company Headquarters

and are used extensively as float aircraft.


The basic unit of operation was located at sector or province level. Here the sector intelligence officer was responsible for assigning missions, targets, briefing, and debriefing the aviator and observer and forwarding reports to higher headquarters. At this level, repeated systematic coverage of the same area by the same aviator observer team resulted in complete familiarity with activity patterns in the area and made abnormalities immediately noticeable.

At division level, the primary utilization of aircraft was in support of combat operations, performing such missions as convoy escort, radio relay, artillery adjustment, and combat observation. Additional support was also rendered to the sectors as well as conducting limited division surveillance. At times division utilized sector aircraft in support of division operations within a specific sector.

Corps aircraft were used primarily for radio relay between headquarters during division operations, adjustment of corps artillery, and naval gunfire. An additional mission accomplished by the corps personnel is that of aerial photography. The results of photo missions has provided the IV Corps Headquarters vital information on areas of impending operations.


Special Forces aircraft provided border surveillance for remote outposts as well as combat observation in support of their operations.

ANNEX B: Pilot Flying Hours




MONTHLY TOTAL —————

ANNEX C: Aircraft Flying Hours



ANNEX C: Aircraft Availability Rate



ANNEX D:

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED IN 1966

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	SERVICE #	RANK
BOEHNER [067]	Robert G.	RA11296188	SP5
MORGAN [605]	Luntford L.	RA24441481	SP4
FRENCH [297]	Allen F.	RA19819607	PFC
GOODVEV [337]	James G.	RA25702153	SGT
HERVEY [393]	Albert E.	OF103845	1LT
SMITH [803]	Harold J.	US3395472	PVT
DAVIS Jr. [205]	Robert J.	RA39496129	SP5
FOX [289]	Joseph H.	O68237	MAJ
MILLIKEN [589]	George A.	RA11405578	SP4
HOBBS [405]	Frederick G.	RA11436964	SP4
KADRMAS [453]	Gordon J.	US55790465	PVT
CARRUTH [138]	Lloyd V.	US54367045	PVT
HAYWARD [386]	Randolph B.	US50202582	PVT
ROLANDO [739]	Frederick D.	RA11463149	PVT
NELSON [639]	Marvin B.	RA56092522	CPL
ALLEN [010]	Frank B.	O5315437	CPT
LEUPOLD [508]	William E.	RA15717515	PFC
COOK [176]	Earl E.	US53406714	PVT
SEIBERT [774]	Edward A.	US52608064	PVT
SPENCER [821]	Robert R.	US52633734	PVT
REITZ [724]	Bernard L	RA17731925	PVT
YOUNG [963]	Joseph D.	US55832368	PVT
THOMPSON [878]	Tommy G.	RA12710558	SP4
VERNON Jr. [897]	Dale L.	RA19832237	PFC
HILL [398]	Bruce J.	RA14859884	SP4
MICHAELIS [581]	Robert H.	RA17673285	SP4
MYERS [623]	John R.	RA18733480	PVT
STATON [832]	Robert E.	RA52544651	SP4
GROCE [349]	Robert W.	RA14895530	SP4
STORA [844]	Thomas W.	RA15732749	PFC
PEREA [660]	Edvardo D.	RA18704918	PFC
GUENTHER [353]	Fredrick L.	OF104434	CPT
LOFTIS [520]	Virgil D	O5317918	1LT
JOHNSON [438]	Emmett F.	093209	CPT
RICOURT [722]	David	RA12736302	PFC
COUSINS [187]	Thomas E.	RA18598928	SP4
LANGENEGGER [486]	Ernest W.	US56387725	PFC
CRUM [195]	William F.	RA19815072	SP4
EVANS Jr. [262]	Will H.	US55820803	PVT

BANKS [027]	Charles J.	O5306603	CPT
GOOD [336]	David W.	O5531946	1LT
KRAMLICK [477]	Milton V.	US56372434	PFC
HARTMAN [376]	Dellino	US55821646	PFC
OLSON [641]	Richard W	RA56281734	SP5
STANSBERRY Jr. [830]	Ora	RA16091251	SGT
TIBBS [882]	Douglas E.	RA13868138	PFC
INGOGLIA Jr. [427]	Joseph E.	RA13871973	PVT
HALBE [364]	William D.	RA19792890	SP4
SCHENKER [764]	Edward H.	US51548663	PVT
MILLER [584]	David W.	RA11440985	PFC
RODMAN [736]	Jerry L.	RA17723671	PVT
SMITH [808]	Stephen R.	US56371920	PFC
McCOY [556]	William C.	RA13320292	SFC
GILSTRAP [330]	Terry L.	US56372703	PVT
SCOTT [770]	Franklin D.	083989	CPT
BLUME [065]	Milton D.	O5415785	1LT
MOORE [601]	Edward N.	O5417839	2LT
SHAFFER [780]	Robert W.	US52615071	PFC
JOHNSON [443]	Paul W.	O5315360	CPT
HEWINSON [394]	Harold D.	RA11171840	1SG
GIMNIG [331]	Robert W.	RA16846861	PVT
LONG [522]	Walter M.	O5406342	1LT
MIELKE [583]	Charles L.	O5532724	2LT
WALDROOP [907]	Jackson E.	RA25692010	SFC
HINES [401]	Robert C.	RA18427840	SP4
POINDEXTER [678]	Alonzo J.	O5414190	CPT
HUYETT [424]	Wayne A.	US55810376	SP4
GREENLEY [345]	John J.	US52664278	PVT
ASHTON [021]	Leonard E.	RA12741020	PVT
TRAPALIS [885]	Alex J.	US55862452	PVT
BECK [040]	Brian B.	US56413414	PVT
CALESTINI [123]	Robert J.	US53405052	PFC
BURRIS [109]	Sidney	US53415287	PVT
CREVELING [191]	Lawrence D.	US51600822	PVT
SCOTT Sr. [771]	Lonnie B.	RA14209618	SFC
MARTIN [534]	Raymond W.	RA52641825	PVT
SANDERS Jr. [756]	Robert J	US52668070	PVT
JACQUES [433]	Robert N.	RA55840834	PVT
WALZ [913]	Stephen G.	RA55884649	PVT
MYERS [624]	Stanley R.	RA55883760	PVT
WAGNER [906]	Donald R	RA16853563	PVT
MOSHER [612]	William D.	RA19753628	SP4
KWIATKOWSKE [482]	Anthony J.	US55864054	PVT
SAPPENFIELD [760]	Charles W.	US52614915	PFC

KIRPY [469]	Jerold W.	RA17701456	SP4
GUIDRY [354]	Vincent L.	US54376095	PVT
CARNETT [135]	Floyd J.	RA17274748	SP4
BLOHOWIAK [063]	George V.	RA55837860	PCT
POOR [683]	William T.	068042	MAJ
OCHOA [636]	Jess J.	RA17290166	SFC
GENDREAU [315]	Raymond L.	US51538527	PVT
CREWS [192]	Eddie J.	US55341908	PVT
ADAMS [003]	Robert E.	US53429512	PVT
BROWN [088]	Delton L.	US52634659	PVT
GUNDERSON [356]	Ronald D.	US55790414	PFC
GILLIARD [327]	Martin F.	RA18744263	PVT
GIBBS [322]	Eugene R.	RA17521178	PVT
SCHAFFITZEL Jr. [763]	Robert J	RA25751077	PFC
JORGENSEN [450]	Phillip A.	US55863039	PVT
FREESE [296]	John R.	US51557178	PFC
MOTT [615]	Darwin W.	US55799899	PFC
JACKSON [430]	Michael E.	RA12756946	PVT
DOUGLAS [235]	Wayne K.	US55805019	PFC
McBRIDE [550]	Claire E.	US56378430	PFC
LEWIS [511]	Robert J.	RA25022418	SFC
ROBERTSON [731]	Guy W.	RA13018664	SFC
SMITH [810]	Thomas F.	RA18664188	SP4
WALKER [910]	William F.	RA14887717	PFC
PIEKARSKE [670]	Paul J.	US52674166	PVT
GATES [312]	Ronald E.	RA14731503	SGT
DICK [216]	Floyd C.	RA13855229	PFC
FURTICK [301]	Busco C.	US53417717	PVT
BROWN [090]	Lester W.	RA13847671	SP4
LASLEY [492]	Billy J.	RA17662735	SP5
MARSHALL [532]	Karl A.	RA18619070	SP5
PETERSEN [663]	Mark R.	RA37769573	SFC
VARNER [895]	Gary D.	O5318432	1LT
MARTINEZ [537]	John M.	RA19410390	SFC
WADE [905]	Richard L.	US55890720	PVT
JOHNSON [439]	Gerald F.	US55869414	PVT
HARTWELL Jr. [378]	Donald A.	RA51505742	SGT
DIXON [225]	John F.	US52642394	PVT
TREM [886]	William L.	O5222207	1LT
BRYAN III [101]	Edward R.	098251	1LT
CALVERT [126]	Richard E.	O5515615	CPT
CATES [311]	Boyce A.	O5320555	1LT
DILLARD [221]	Gale P.	O522072	1LT
FRESHOUR [300]	Charles E.	O2301085	1LT
WILLIAMS [943]	Earl	O5314164	CPT

SMITH [811]	Tommy R.	O5419000	2LT
McANDREW [549]	Dennis P.	O5226928	1LT
MONTGOMERY [597]	William	096491	CPT
LERCH [507]	Paul S.	098489	1LT
STONE Jr. [843]	James E.	O531424	1LT
STOCKTON [841]	Larry D.	O5312909	CPT
CHRISTIANSEN [152]	John E.	O5017921	1LT
MASSEY [541]	Ronald F.	097666	CPT
GEE [314]	Bobby J.	098101	CPT
MARLOW [531]	Michael M.	O54116922	1LT
SCHWINGHAMMER [768]	Alfred F.	O5322178	1LT
AGEE Jr. [005]	Damon W.	085819	CPT
RENTMEESTER [710]	Richard G.	O5315268	CPT
McGRAW [562]	Jimmy J.	O5409703	CPT
LEWIS [512]	Ted V.	RA15423569	SFC
RICE [715]	Harvey J.	RA42243442	SP5
SHINER [784]	John R.	ER54356250	PFC
GRIFFIN [346]	Keith E.	RA56417805	PVT
BULLOCK [104]	Dennis R.	RA52678891	PVT
PARKER [647]	William L.	RA55100407	SGT
THOMAS [870]	Edward M.	O5517442	CPT
VICTORY [898]	Harvey C.	US53383581	PFC
MICHALEK [582]	Vincent S.	US55838598	PFC
REGNIER [708]	Thomas A.	RA18731791	SP4
BORCHARDT [070]	Gerald L.	O5535685	1LT
SEARS [772]	Rondal E.	US52631603	PVT
JOHNSON [444]	Randolph V.	RA16862734	PFC
SANDERS [756]	Robert A.	US53398741	PFC
COLLINS [165]	Andrew B.	RA13466219	SP6
GILBERT [324]	Larry E.	US53416830	PFC
BREWER [081]	Jordan L.	US55834169	SP4
NEWSOME [631]	Benjamin F.	US51642886	PVT
KENNETT [460]	Keith A.	US55861565	PFC
GONZALES [335]	Jonny	RA18746574	PFC
SUNDBERG [854]	David C.	O5517507	CPT
DUPONT [246]	Robert J.	US55896330	PVT
PORTER [685]	Jerry C.	US55844393	SP4
VINKE [899]	Gale C.	US55792773	PFC
LYNN [524]	Richard D.	RA16831447	PVT
BOYNTON [075]	Dennis W.	US56689232	PVT
PODISH [677]	Edward	RA13519704	SP5
MONAGHAN [594]	Henry J.	US52653308	SP4
DUNHAM [244]	Melvin A.	RA5642265	PFC
SLOAN [799]	David M.	RA18765096	PVT
SAMMONS [753]	Lawrence G.	RA18708191	PFC

ANNEX E:

Roster of Company Commanders

Major Donald Modica [592]	1 Jan 66 – 20 Feb 66
Major Joseph H. Fox [289]	21 Feb 66 – 22 Jul 66
Major William T. Poor [683]	22 Jul 66 – 31 Dec 66

ANNEX F:

ROSTER OF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Captain Leigh M. Ogden [639]	1 Jan 66 – 15 Jun 66
Captain Franklin D. Scott [770]	16 Jun 66 – 15 Aug 66
Captain Damon W. Agee [005]	16 Aug 66 – 31 Dec 66

ANNEX G:

ROSTER OF PLATOON LEADERS

1st Airplane Platoon

Captain Arthur K. Goto [338]	1 Jan 66 – 14 Jun 66
Captain Emmett F. Johnson [438]	15 Jun 66 – 31 Dec 66

2nd Airplane Platoon

Captain Leon D. Jackson [429]	1 Jan 66 – 14 Jun 66
Captain Charles J. Banks [027]	15 Jun 66 – 31 Dec 66

3rd Airplane Platoon

Captain Robert C. McKenzie [564]	1 Jan 66 – 5 May 66
Captain Stanley S. Dodds [227]	6 May 66 – 21 Oct 66
Captain Jimmy J. McGraw [562]	22 Oct 66 – 31 Dec 66

4th Airplane Platoon

Captain Arthur R. Littlewood [517]	1 Jan 66 – 14 Jun 66
Captain Richard H. Collins [972]	15 Jun 66 – 10 Nov 66
Captain Larry D. Stockton [841]	11 Nov 66 – 31 Dec 66

Maintenance Platoon

Captain John O. Northridge [635]	1 Jan 66 – 10 May 66
Captain John G. Leonard [506]	11 May 66 – 1 Oct 66
Captain Fredrick L. Guenther [353]	2 Oct 66 – 31 Dec 66

Operations Officers

Captain Jack Poole [682]

1 Jan 66 – 5 May 66

Captain Robert C. McKenzie [564]

6 May 66 – 15 Jun 66

Captain Frank B. Allen [010]

16 Jun 66 – 31 Dec 66

ANNEX H:

ROSTER OF FIRST SERGEANTS

1SG William L.E. Beetem [042]	1 Jan 66 – 5 Jun 66
1SG Harold D. Hewinson [394]	6 Jun 66 – 14 Aug 66
1SG Guy W. Robertson [731]	15 Aug 66 – 31 Dec 66